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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMpANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Case No.
8785

STRUCTURAL STEEL & FORGE CO.,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Believing appellant's statement of facts to be inadequate, we present to the Court our own statement.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent,_ Union Pacific Railroad CQmp~ny, commenced four seJ>J!!'~~t~ act19ns against appellant in the Third
J uqj~i~l~P.i~t.r.i.~t (J_<>urt_ qf.th~ State of l]tap., in ~nd for Salt
La.~e _Qounty, to recover undercharges on shipments of iron
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and steel yro.Q_t.t~ts. The four complaints contain 104 causes
of action, and the damages sought by the Railroad amount
to approximately $50,000. Appellant ~enies that Union
P~Gif.i~ _
.51t entitled to .the ~uruier.charg.es an.d....alleges.,._futer
alia, thatit, h.as_p~i d .all .of._the .freight.Ja.wf11l JY.~du.eJ.>.IL.ea.c.h
cause of action ..
At all times involved appellant was in the business
of fabrication and manufacture of various iron and steel
products. Respondent alleges that during the period between July 1, 1953 and August 1, 1955, appellant made
numerous shipments of iron and steel articles from Salt
Lake City, Utah, to various destinations. On each of these
shipments appellant claimed the benefit of a through rate
from point of origin, which had been outside the State of
Utah, to the point of final destination, under the provisions
of respondent's f~ricatiQn:in:tr~nsit tariff..
The tariff is UP 7188-P, effective May 15, 1952, entitled "Rules and Charges Governing Fabrication and Treating of Structural Iron or Steel in Transit at Stations in
* * * Utah * * * on U. P. R. R., as Defined in
Item No. 5."* l~.Pul:Uished and maintained b~ respand~nt . to~gi.ye_ ,ellin:ger§ the be.nef.its _
_of.J.L_through rate from
origin. to ulthnate J!g§ii.Jl~~JQJt on carlg_~~t shipments of iron
a..nd.. steeL articles which a.re s.tOillled .in the...cuurse of .tr.aU§it
at_ variQ~J~_..§~tJQJl§ . ..QI.t the U:gion Pacific Railroad ,.{Qt..the
purpose of rewor~ing_Qr_jabrt~atj_~g. The tariff requires,
among other things, the surrender of the inbound transit
billing representative of the material actually used in fab*For material excerpts from this tariff and its supplements applicable
to the issues in these cases, see Appendix.
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rication or reworking the outbound commodity. To be
eligible for the through transit rate the shipper is subjected
to the rules and conditions of the transit tariff.**
The causes of action in the four lawsuits involve instances where appellant has shipped iron or steel products
from its headquarters at Salt Lake City, Utah, to various
points of destination, upon which it paid freight charges
based upon the through transit rate from point of origin to
final destination, claiming the fabrication-in-transit privilege set forth in 7188-P and applicable supplements. Respondent claims that appellant misconstrued the application of the transit privilege and that it does not apply,
contending therefore that freight charges should be assessed on the shipments from Salt Lake City, Utah, to
points of destination as separate movements.
The issue, then, is whether the tariffs asserted by
Union Pacific and listed in the record in its answers to
**Transit is the right of a shipper to stop a carload shipment at an
intermediate point and change the form or substance of the commodity
shipped and afterwards reship the commodity to the point of final destination at a totaL_chaJ:'..,g:_~ for.Jra~nsp9.r.tation.J..lllt..~x~~~djnK...:tM1 w_hi~h
wnul d haye. b~ appU~~Li;tJh~cJlanged .,e.Qmm.9.ditx...JJ&g. J?.g~Jl_ shipped
~Prigi;rt.J.P.,.fin.~J. . destination yvjthout_ h~ing stopped_Jn.
transit. The privilege of transit is a departure from the usual and
ordinary transportation service of a carrier. Under it, shippers are
afforded more favorable rates than would obtain if the inbound and
outbound movement to transit points were treated as separate ship. ments. It is actl]J!.llx.,Jl!~, stopping 9;( a commo~]jty fo~. process or Q~her
purJ)~..s_u..nder an a;rx:angeme.nt which." by .a" .fiction ti~s the_ in:Qq-qnd
and outh2!!JML!!tovement tqg_e.,tper §JLa.~,.Jo . ~reate.~. in J.~_w, J!-~Q.ntin!!9.ll.l?,.
through movemgnt_..a»Jl. lJ.Qtj;_wo. separ.ate movements. Propriety of
Operating Practices-New York Warehousing, 216 I. C. C. 291, at 349
(1936); Transit on Cotton Seed at Quanah, Texas, 232 I. C. C. 183, at
188 (1939) ; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 263 I. C. C.
503, at 509 ( 1945).
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interrogatories to each cause of action, should determine
the rates to be applied to the shipments or whether the
through rate based upon the privilege granted by 7188-P
should control. This, in turn, depends upon the construction
and interpretation given to the various Items of the transit
tariff.
An examination of the pleadings and discovery in the
record reveals that most of the causes of action are based
upon three standard fact situations:
( 1) In a majority of the causes of action the inbound
shipment contains a product which is one of those listed
in Item 5 of the tariff. The outbound shipment is a mixed
carload containing .-&Une...xe.w_or.ked m.at__ecial... but tbe_unreworked products is another article listed in _Item 5. An
example of this situation may be found in the sixth cause
of action in Case No. 106336. This raises the question of
the proper meaning of the various words and phrases in
Item 5 and Item 125 as to whether the outbound unfabricated transit articles in a mixed shipment is transit material
entitling the transit operator to the balance of the through
rate. The problem is contained in the order of referral to
the Interstate Commerce Commission as Question No. 1.
(2) A majority of the causes of action also involve
the situation where the inbound shipment consists of one of
the· articles listed in Item 5 as transit material, and the outbound shipment, or a part thereof, c.onsists of a different
product but also listed as transit material in Item 5. The
outbound shipment consists merely of the second transit
item, which has been reworked or fabricated. This situa:
tion and its variations bring into issue the meanin<T and
~---· .. - - - - ~--,----··--- - · - - - - - -..-·--,~~--~,- - .. , ....

" ............. '

0
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CQit~ruct~Qn

of the WQrds and phrases ~of_ Item_100 of the
tarif.f~~~,J;o wh~th~r.tr~nsitjs.__ proper on outbound reworked
co~mo~ities _w.h!~_h,__ a,._~~- _;t:I.2t . rep~es_~l1tative of_ the inbound
pro<!_uct. An example involving this issue also may be
found in the sixth cause of action in Case No. 106336. The
referral order to the Interstate Commerce Commission presents this issue as Question No. 3.
A number of the causes of action involve the situation where the inbound shipment of transit material is
unloaded at a non-transit warehouse and the outbound
shipment, which comes from appellant's warehouse, is supported by a freight bill or credit slip represented by the
inbound shipment unloaded at the nontransit warehouse.
An example involving these facts may be found in the
sixty-seventh cause of action of Case No. 106671. The issue
involves the proper con§tt!l~l!Q:tl -~-n.<l interpretation of Items
80 and 120 of the tariff. The referral order to the Interstate Commerce Commission presents this issue as Question
No.4.
(3)

A lesser number of the cases involve two additional
fact situations: The first is whether the transit balance
is applicable on outbound carloads after storage at the
transit station, where no fabrication or reworking took
place at the transit station. An example of this situation
may be found in the fifty-second cause of action of Case
No. 106671. The referral order to the Interstate Commerce
Commission presents this issue as Question No. 2. The second situation is where transit credits covering inbound
shipments of steel sheets are asserted as a basis for claiming
transit balance rates on outbound shipments of coated and
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wrapped pipe. There is no express language in the tariff
providing for coating and wrapping of pipe fabricated
from steel sheets at the transit point. This raises the question of the proper construction to be given to paragraph
Three of Item 5, and Exceptions 2, 3 and 4. An example
of this problem may be found in the first cause of action
in Case No. 106336. It is listed in the referral order to the
Interstate Commerce Commission as Question No. 5.
Re_£ognJ~LI.l_g_..t.h.~.~techni~a:Utr

_a!ld comple~ity _of· the
terminology in the~:r;iff and' !_he lack of the ..<;QY!fi_jpri~
dicti.ou to Jn-'lkre.~Jl. . det.e_trmJp~tiop. ~q( jts p_rop~r. ~~ani:ng_ as
it is involved in these. _<;~s~~~- respondei.:J:.t in accordance with
the mand~te qf!h~. §BJ!!"~!ll~~gg:g_tl_i:g.~_Q.?!ited States v. Western Pacific R._ Co., 352 U. S. 59,
77 S. Ct. 161, 1 -.L. Ed. -·.2d
---.--126, (1956)1. petitioned the district court on October 4,
19.5.7,_.i.or. anorde.r...ofrefe.r.xal~p:C.five specific issues of {3~
and tariff construction to the Interstate Commerce Commission for determination and to hold the trials of the
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la,7~~!li!~.J~ ~peyance . -y.ntU t~is h~~-Jt~en com_pl~ (R!.,-87-

39). On November 8, 1957, by memorandum decision, the
district court in granting said referral stated :
"The lawsuit primarily involves a recovery of
charges for carriage of steel products. Primary
jurisdiction of that cause is in the Utah District
Court. Within the overall controversy are issues, the
adequate consideration of which would require an
acquaintance of many intricate facts of transportation. Settlement of these issues seems to involve an
inquiry which is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters. This, under the best
reasoning- of the cases cited, is for the Interstate
Commerce Commission" (R. 40).
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The order of referral, dated November 12, 1957 (R.
42-43) submitted the issues of tariff interpretation and
issues of fact to the Interstate Commerce Commission and
held the causes in a~eyance durin.g the interim and retained jurisdiction of the causes. for all purposes.
The five questions involving the construction of Tariff
7188-P in the order of referral to the Interstate Commerce
Commission are as follows:
"1. Is a transit operator entitled to the balance of through rate on the unfabricated and unreworked products contained in an outbound mixed
shipment consisting of some transit fabricated or
reworked products and some unfabricated andjor
unreworked products, if the unfabricated andjor unreworked products are products listed in Item 5 of
said tariff, assuming the transit operator has complied with all other essential provisions of said
tariff?

"2. Is a transit operator entitled to the balance
of through rate on outbound straight carload shipments of products listed in I tern 5 of said tariff if
said products have merelx_.!?ee_rl "§t9r"~9.. ~t.. the transjt
station..3ud,...,hilYe.JlQ;tbeeJl."!abx.ica.ted or reworked at
the transit station?
"3. Is a transit operator entitled to the balance
of through rate on an outbound product which is
fabricated or reworked but which could not have
been fabricated in whole or in part from the commodity represented by the inbound billing surrendered, assuming that all other provisions of said
tariff have been compli~d with by the transit operator?
"4. Is the transit operator entitled to the balance of through rate on commodities not unloaded
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into the warehouse or manufacturing plant of the
outbound shipper and not transferred to the outbound shipper together with the inbound freight
bill or tonnage credit slip under certification?
"5. Is a transit operator entitled to surrender
transit credits covering inbound shipments of steel
sheets as a basis for claiming the balance of through
rate on outbound shipments of coated and wrapped
pipe?"
Appellant filed a petition for intermediate appeal on
or about December 11, 1957, and respondent filed timely
answer. On April 2, 1958, the Supreme Court denied the
petition. However, on appellant's filing a motion for reconsideration of the petition and for oral orgument, to
which a motion to dismiss was filed, the Supreme Court,
on April 22, 1958, vacated the order of April 2, 1958, and
granted the interlocutory appeal.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE UTAH DISTRICT COUR'f, A COURT OF
GENERAL JURISDICTION, HAS THE POWER
AND THE DUTY TO REFER ISSUES TO THE
INTERSTATE C 0 M MER C E COMMISSION
WHEN THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION IS APPLICABLE.
A.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

B.

When primary jurisdiction applies, the issues
for determination are within the exclusive
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province of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
C.

It is immaterial whether the referral is upon
instigation of the carrier or the shipper.

D.

It is immaterial whether the referral in this
case is from a state or federal district court,
they being both courts of general and concurrent jurisdiction.

E.

Referral to the Interstate Commerce Commission is not barred by the Statute of Limitations under 49 U.S. C. A. 16 (3) even though
more than two years have elapsed since the
causes of action accrued.

POINT II.
THE NECESSITY FOR DETERMINATION OF
FACTS FROM EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AND
THE PROBLEMS OF TARIFF CONSTRUCTION PRESENT ISSUES IN THESE CAUSES
WITHIN THE SPECIAL COMPETENCE OF
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION, AND THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY ALLOCATED THE ISSUES IN THE
SUITS.
A.

The questions referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission for construction raise issues of transportation policy which must be
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considered by the Commission in the interests
of uniform and expert administration.
B.

Suspension of the judicial process and retention of jurisdiction by the district court for
all purposes was proper since, upon return,
the court must determine all remaining issues
of fact and law, award damages, if proper,
and enforce judgments, if any.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE UTAH DISTRICT COURT, A COURT OF
GENERAL JURISDICTION, HAS THE POWER
AND. THE DUTY TO REFER ISSUES TO THE
INTERSTATE C 0 M MER C E COMMISSION
WHEN THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION IS APPLICABLE.
A.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Primary jurisdiction is a principle which determines
whether an administration agency or a court of general
jurisdiction should decide certain questions. If applicable,
it requires that those questions or issues in a claim be
brought to the agency for determination before the entire
controversy in the court of general jurisdiction is resolved.
Its purpose is to provide a uniform application of rules,
rates and regulations in regulated industries and to secure
the aid of those who are trained and experienced in a particular technical field. The concept is frequently expressed
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by reference to the wording of the Supreme Court in Far

East Conference v. United States, 342 U. S. 570, 574, 72 S.
Ct. 492, 96 L. Ed. 576 ( 1952) :

"* * * a principle, now firmly established,
is that in cases raising issues of fact not within the
conventional experience of judges or cases requiring
the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies
created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so even though
the facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and
consistency in the regulation of business entrusted
to a particular agency are secured, and the limited
functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances under lying
legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than
courts by specialization, by insight gained through
experience, and by more flexible procedure."
The doctrine was first conceived in Texas & P. R. Co.
v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350, 51
L. Ed. 553, in 1907. Justice White, "its innovator, gifted
in this instance with extraordinary prevision, underpinned
the doctrine with a rationale which is still accepted." von
Mehren, The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 929, at 932 (1954).
"The substance of the doctrine is that where
by appropriate legislation an administrative agency
is vested with juris diction under a regulatory scheme
to set rules, regulations and standards of conduct
and performance in technical, scientific and complicated matters of commercial and industrial activity,
judicial process will not be exercised in damage
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claims involving determination of the same rules,
regulations and standards without reference to administrative action thereon. This means that even
though court jurisdiction to entertain a common law
right of action exists, exercise thereof will be suspended pending administrative determination of
matters essential to the action as to which primary
jurisdiction has been vested in an administrative
agency by legislative action. Precise language to
such effect is not always found in legislative acts
to which courts have applied the primary jurisdiction principle." Ellison v. Rayonier, Inc., 156 F.
Supp. 214, at 218, 219 (W. D., Wash., 1957).
Since its origin primary jurisdiction has grown rapidly
and although its first application was in the field of interstate commerce, "the principle is clearly applicable whenever courts and agencies have concurrent jurisdiction."
Davis, Administrative Law, (1951) at 669.
The latest application of the doctrine by the Supreme
Court was in United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., supra,
where a clear analysis is stated beginning at page 62 as
follows:
"We are met at the outset with the question
of whether the Court of Claims properly applied the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction in ths case; tl!@.!, is,
whether it correctly allocated the .issues in the...suit
between ,ibe jur.isd.i..cti~ut.Pf~_the l.:tlt~r&tate_ Commerce
Commission a.ud that _of. the court. * * * because we regard the maintenance of a proper relationship between the courts and the Commission in
matters affecting transportation policy to be of continuing public concern, we have been constrained to
inquire into this aspect of the decision. We have concluded that in the circumstances here presented the
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question of tariff construction, as well as that of the
reasonableness of the tariff as applied, was within
the exclusive primary juris diction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
"The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, like the
rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties. 'Exhaustion' applies where a claim is cognizable in the
first instance by an administrative agency alone;
judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. 'Primary jurisdiction,' on the other hand, applies where a claim is
orginally cognizable in the courts, and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of fssues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its views.
General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U. S. 422, 433.
"No fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In every case the
question is whether the reasons for the existence of
the doctrine are present and whether the purposes
it serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation. These· reasons and purposes have
often been given expression by this Court. In the
earlier cases emphasis was laid on the desirable uniformity which would obtain if initially a specialized
agency passed on certain types of administrative
questions. See Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426. More_r,g,~tJy the
~~E~rt ___ ~EM~-·--,~·pe~~!al!~~~ -~P9'Y!~flzg· __,Qf_~tJt~, agen.c~es.
iJl.v__oJved -~b.fu"·--· _been pa:rti.cuJar ly -~,&txe.ss.ed. * * *
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The doctrine of primary jurisdiction thus does 'more
than prescribe the mere procedural time table of
the lawsuit. It is a doctrine allocating the law-making power over certain aspects' of commercial relation. 'It transfers from court to agency the power
to determine' some of the incidents of such relations."
Appellant has selected statements of various writers
who have criticized the doctrine or its origin (App. Br. 11,
18), leaving an inference of its general disapproval. This
is not the fact. Even these writers recognize the powerful
reasons for the doctrine or its merit.* Others are outspoken in its favor; for example, von Mehren, supra, at 965,
states:
"The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is essential to effective regulation. Without it members of
regulated industries would be subject to the commands of two masters-the regulatory statute as administered by the agency and the * * * laws as
administered by the courts. Although in some instances regulated companies should respond to the
commands of both agency and court, they should not
be required to do so until the agency has defined its
interest in the matter to be considered by the court.
This is all that primary jurisdiction doctrine seeks
to achieve."
However, while writers have disagreed on some of its
aspects, the doctrine is firmly integrated into the law, and
the courts' only function is its proper application.
*Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconside'l'ed, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577, at
604 (1954).

Davis, supra, at 665.
Convisser, Prinw,ry Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its Rationali.zations,
65 Yale L. J. 315 (1956).
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Appellant, we submit, is in error in its analysis of the
basic nature of the doctrine. (App. Br. 18-20.) It i~_tb_~r.~
asserted that_nrimaryJum.di~timLinY.Q}ves _a.n initial concurrent jurisdiction PJ~tW~!Hl.tb,e.~.JiroJDistrative_ and judicial
forums_,_ and since Jh~L.:R.ailroad has ..110.. right. to. c.ommence
its_ initial action J~efQ:re. . t.be _ Commission, as_ contra.sted.-±o .a.
shipper given the alternate !.~c~.Q:tp:§.~.,-tQ_Jh.e.. Comrnissio:p.~o:r
tb£l~.tl~r.~l.£<:nrrtJJ!t<Jer~-s~~tJQn _l}~Qf tll.JLA~t <L.l~ JJ. ._,s._. G.~ A.

Sec. 9), there i~_.!!Q.Jp.ilj~~J cqncurrent jqrisdiction and tbqs
the doctrine doe..a.JlQ..Lc.ome_.into.~.play. The premise for appellant's conclusion is a statement by Davis, supra, at 664:
"Questions of primary jurisdiction arise only
when the statutory arrangements are such that administrative and judicial jurisdiction are concurrent
for the initial decision of some questions."
An examination of Davis' analysis of Primary Jurisdiction (pp. 664-675), from which this statement was
taken, reveals its proper meaning. It is merely to distinguish and contrast the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
from other doctrines involved in the division of functions
between the courts and administrative agencies, notably,
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The latter controls
the timing of judicial relief from agency action, and j urisdiction is in a single forum at all times. Primary ju.r..is.diction, on the other.. hand, _.is nqt concerned _)Y~t1tj_l1d..i~i-~l
revie.!Y..,_ but decides whether .the..Jnitial.. determination of
sqme -~qP:~~!~o~s -~hould_ be by . th~ court in ~hich the action
was commenced and is pending or by the_ appr_o_priate. admfuistra.ti.Ye agency. Thus there must be concurrent jurisdiction both in the court and the agency to hear and decide
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certain questions in a given field, such as interstate commerce, but OJ!~~L!P.~_det~!m!n&t!9!tJ~ !P$l~l~~ tl!~tth~ ~g_ep.~y
s·P:2.!!!4 ma~e th~~~.~i§l91!~~9J_ eertaip> questions, it§.iu:r:~dic
tion is . e:xclusive.
Appellant has also applied the concurrent aspect of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction prematurely. The determ-

wheth.er ..thtLcQurt...ox.. t~ncL should ma._Ire.'"tl!tL
initiaLJle_cisio~J~L..llQLconsidered_JJntil aft.e.t:..-tbe. original
iiJ~.ti.9JLQf

clai.mjs cognizable .in ~ court of generaljurisdiction ... United
States v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra, at 64.
The reference by appellant to Section 9 of the Act as
an example of concurrent administrative and judicial jurisdiction between the Commission and the federal courts
in the case of a shipper commencing the action, is also in
error. That section merely gives a shipper alternative
remedies in "suit (s) * * * for the recovery of the
damages for which * * * (a) common carrier may be
liable under the provisions of this chapter," ( 49 U. S. C. A.,
Sec. 9) and a shipper cannot file his action in the federal
court under Section 9 where his claim for damages necessarily involves a question of reasonableness, calling for the
exercise of the Commission's exclusive primary jurisdiction.
United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 337 U.
S. 426, 69 S. Ct. 1410, 93 L. Ed 1451 (1949) ; Feinstein v.
New York Central Railroad Co., 159 F. Supp. 460, at 464
(S. D., N. Y., 1958), and cases cited therein.
B.

When primary jurisdiction applies, the issues
for determination are within the exclusive
province of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
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Where certain issues within an overall controversy
must properly be referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission for its determination, the court loses its jurisdiction
to hear and decide those issues, and the judicial process is
suspended. The sole forum with the power to determine
those issues is the agency.

"* * * Whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body" (United
States v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra, at 64),
those issues are "within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission."
!d., 63, (Emphasis added).
"The * * * language of the Supreme Court
in the Western Pacific case is imperative in its effect. It held that as to question of tariff construction and reasonableness of rate as applied, that
question 'was within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.' * * *
The word exclusive means 'shut out,' 'debarring
from participation.' Black's Law Dictionary notes,
'These words preclude the idea of co-existence, and
mean possessed to the exclusion of others.'" United
States v. Apicella, 148 F. Supp. 457, 458, (D., N. J.,
1957).
See also: Armour & Co. v. Alton R. Co., 312 U. S. 195,
61 S. Ct. 498, 85 L. Ed. 771 (1941) ; General American Tank
Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U. S. 422, 60 S.
Ct. 325, 84 L. Ed. 361 (1940) ; Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285, 42 S. Ct. 477, 66 L.
Ed. 943 (1922); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Solum, 247
U.S. 477, 38 S. Ct. 550, 62 L. Ed. 1221 (1918) ; Northwest,ern Auto Parts Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 240 F. 2d 743,
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749 (C. C. A.-8, 1957) ; United States v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 217 F. 2d 763 (C. C. A.-8, 1954); Northern
Pa.c. Ry. Co. v. United States, 213 F. 2d 366 (C. C. A.-8,
1954) ; Western Oil & Fuel Co. v. Great Lakes Pipe Line
Co., 210 F. 2d 490 (C. C. A.-8, 1954) ; and United States v.
Alaska S. S. Co., 110 F. Supp. 104 (W. D., Wash., 1952).

C.

It is immaterial whether the referral is upon
instigation of the carrier or the shipper.

Appellant has much to say about the fact that the petition for referral was by the carrier rather than by the
shipper. It also makes the unfounded claim that Union
Pacific is attempting, by a device, to gain access to the
Interstate Commerce Commission (App. Br. 6).
It is not disputed that there is no statute allowing
Union Pacific to initiate an original proceeding in these
cases before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
Federal statute provides only for actions at law (49 U. S.
C. A., Sec. 16 (3)). Nor is it disputed that a shipper has
dual initial remedies in actions against carrier for damages
( 49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 9 and 13). Byt_!!Ql!~J?f_ these statp.tg~
~~. C<?"!!cer.~~d JYJth primary j !!ri.s_djctiOll..___

Since the issues allocated to the Commission under the
doctrine are exclusively within its jurisdiction, there is no
court of general jurisdiction with the power to hear and
decide such issues. Tperef.<?:r~~ jf ~ll~ sh~pper doea..not..ask
for the referral, as was the case here, it i~UhEt_~gutL gf ~he
carrier._tq_99. so. Otherwise the __n:J..a.ndate of the._ Supreme
C<?!-!.~i.l~~ ~q<?.}Y.!:l. . i.~w~t!t~~ ...J.f§st~_Eaci[ic_ ~~se.__lYould be ig:
no:r~.Q~ .an~ issu~~__Erop_~Jl allQ_cable .~!-~ age.IJ.£L_'X_ould

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
remaixtin_tb_e court of_gen._Etl:a_Lj Qt.isdicti9.1l...at.1b.lLWllim ~~f
the_ shipper.
This is not a reference for the specific purpose of having the Commission determine the respondent's claim (App.
Br., 6) ; it is simply a reference of those issues within the
lawsuit which call for the aid of an agency schooled in
unraveling the mysteries of tariff construction. In such
matters the Commission, under law, has preempted the
field.
The Conuni~~_io:n's,ct~t~r:mi~ation will P~- equ~lly_}l.!JJ.ding
o~_ all parties to the suit, and the result~_ mJ;tY .b~J~_yox.~'bl~
to shi;uper. a ILQ~sibiJJty_ -~'YlliG..l!.,~J~.J)p_~Jl~nt__h~§__Ju>~~rently
ignored. Both parties are entitled to appear before the
Commission to protect their interests and participate in
the proceedings. The ultimate result is therefore the same
regardless of which party seeks the initial referral.
The question of referral on petition of the carrier
came before the court in United States v. Canfield Driveaway Co., 159 F. Supp. 448 (E. D., Mich., 1958). In that
case the court readily recognized the holding of the Western
Pacific case and ordered that the referral be made. At page
455 the court stated:
"In this case, however, it is the carrier, whose
charges have been paid in full, who insists that a
reference be made. The Court cannot find a spelling
out of procedure whereby a carrier situated as the
defendant in this case, would initiate a proceeding
before the Interstate Commerce Commission. I do
not find any decided case in which the application
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies, with
the procedural background of the case at Bar. :t{Qjr.
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withstandin~-ho...weYer, that tber.a.s..e.ema.=to be 119
~ell-defin_~g ... I!r9_,G~Q.!lr~l.Patlt _tQ _. _f, ()]l()W, jf ~.th~- _.<jQC;;
t:t:Jne _gf~1h~-,!f~~§1~IJ! Eff.cifjc J~~$e Js. J_Q_ be. followed}..
t:Q_J§...9.9l!!:t sho:gJ9. not ~gt helpless merely_b_e..c~l1S~ h~

<lo..e.s__noJ__~.iind ._ a Couti.., rule or procedural . statute... .
which_gjy~~-spe~jfic qire~tion J!,§_

to .llow_j~_o=_proce~d."

The same situation gave no trouble to the court in
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, supra. There the
carrier initiated the action and contended on appeal that
the trial court could not make a preliminary determination
of whether the words in the disputed tariff were used in a
peculiar or extraordinary sense. The trial court had made
the determination in favor of the shipper and the appellate
court reversed, holding that the question was one of fact,
which would have to be determined by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
D.

It is immaterial whether the referral in this
case is from a state or federal district court,
they being both courts of general and concurrent jurisdiction.

The main thrust of appellant's argument in this appeal
is based upon the fact that the actions were commenced in
the state rather than the federal district cou1·t. Appellant
claims that referral to a federal administrative agency is
beyond what the state tribunal should do voluntarily and,·
as a matter of law, cannot otherwise do. The reasoning for
this argument seems to be: first, it is undesirable to refer
because of the reluctance of the state courts to abdicate
their jurisdiction ; second, reference to an agency outside
the scope of the state judicial and administrative system
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violates both separation of powers and federalism; and
third, the Interstate Commerce Commission has no responsibility to the state court.
It is interesting to nQte t.hat~Jhe__QoGtx..in.~~QI,. priroJJ,fY
jurisdiction =-!~§J!lte.9.... JX.9ID ..J!.J~~~t~,..J~.Q1Jri,_ P!:Q.~~~_c;U.nK~--··. In
Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., supra, the shipper commenced its action in a state court of Texas to recover damages for excessive freight charges. The reasonableness of the rate was at issue, and the state appellate
court held that such issue could be determined by the court
even though the rate had been filed and promulgated by the
carrier pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the uniform application of rates to all required that the sole determination of
unreasonableness of rates be vested solely within the Commission. Thus the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was
born and a principle established which has not varied since:
Wheue.ve.:r. _the . J~~ue_ J>eJQ:r..e. ~tb~. c_Q_lJI.tJ.nYQl¥e~"- the que~tion
ot pn:r~-~§Q!!~bl~.!!.~~§-~Qf. ~ ,.:r~a,.te, Jh.~ .~X:<;ll!~ty_e ,_.P:rtmary jurisdi~J.!Qll is. Jn _t}le Commission,_ and no_co~rt, be it _.state or
fede,rJJ.l., has the power to proceed. United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra.
It is apparent from the holding of the Abilene case that
where issues are within the primary jursdiction of the
Commission, a state court has no jurisdiction. It also illustrates that appellant's argument that state courts are reluctant to give away jurisdiction, is without merit.
A question arose as to whether Abilene wholly super-

seded the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts in inter-
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state commerce matters. That problem was solved in
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Co., 237 U. S. 121, 35
S. -Ct. 484, 59 L. Ed. 867 ( 1915), involving a suit in a state
court by a shipper for damages caused by the carrier's
refusal to furnish cars. The Supreme Court held that Section 22 of the Act (49 U.S. C. A., Sec. 22), which preserved
all common law and statutory remedies, thus allowing suits
in state courts, was not superseded by the holding in the
Abilene case ; but _!he ~Ql!!:~__P-2!_~t~.(L.Q_lJ_t tb~t _t}JJ~re was no
juri_S.~~ct!ol1_ ip ~tate, as ~ell_a,s J~qer~l_~Q!l~ under_ Section
9,---'""""where
the issue involved was
the "determination
of mat.......
-..
...
-----
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ters _cal~ing f9:r_ t~e. _gx~r~i§~~- ot ~~gmt!!i§t!~!iv~ -~9W~r_and
discretion of the Commission." I d., at 130. Thus the state
courts were retained in the operative scheme of primary
jurisdiction in the same manner as it applied to federal
courts.
~--------<-.;-.---~

-

.:; __

-

.

-

In Great Northern Ry. Co., v. Merchants' Elev. Co.,
supra, the problem for decision was tariff construction
rather than reasonableness of rates. Here again the action
was commenced in a state court of general jurisdiction. The
Minnesota trial court construed the meaning of the tariff
rather than referring the matter to the Commission, and
the Supreme Coutt affirmed. The issue was: "whether
any court had jurisdiction of the controversy, in view of the
fact that the Interstate Commerce Commission had not
passed upon the disputed question of construction." Id.,
290 The court held that the disputed question of construction, being one wholly of law, was properly a matter for
the court to make the determination, and therefore referral
to the Interstate Commerce Commission was unnecessary. The
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juri~9~£t!Qn.._!it.-

determine matters .of.. J~r~ff construction
ipvolyJng w§ol~JX~ ql1estiQns _oJ law ._!Yas JPJ!~ J~!t in the_ state
coy:rt_s~ However, the Supreme Court recog_nizedthat whenever extrin.§ic.. ~_vid~l!.C..~. may _Q.{L ne~~§s~ry JQ. _q~t~rm~ne dth~t
meaning of words used in the tariff in a peculiar or technical sen§g__,__Qr_JgJ~§ta.blish a usag_e_ of tra(le_ or _locality which
attaches provisions not expressed in the tariff, "the preliminary determination must be made by the Commissio:q;
and not until this determination has been made, can a cour~
take jurisdiction of the controversy." /d., 292. The meaning
of the language is clear: If the state court proceeding had
involved tariff construction where preliminary resort to
the Commission was necessary, the Supreme Court would
have directed the state court to withhold its proceeding
until the matter of primary jurisdiction had been concluded.
As Justice Brandeis states:
_ _ . _ . . . . _ ................ .-uo<~:o.>-.1·- .....J ..... ~·... ~ .. :.-.• •..__ .~.~-·".-:' ....... ~,

···-

·-~-··

.•'-'

.

'

-

~-··

--·~

-·--·

_-_

.·

'-----

-

"If this were not so, that uniformity which it
is the purpose of the Commerce Act to secure could
not be attained." ld., 292.
The cases before the Court on this appeal involve nothing more than the situation described in the Great Northern
case, requiring preliminary resort and determination by the
Commission.
In its development, as the foregoing cases illustrate,
primary jurisdiction was applied in two separate fields of
interstate transportation: iir§.t_,~ in t~~--~:r:~a _()f. reasonableness~ot r~tes, pr~,Gtj~g~, and rules, where the jurisdiction
of the Co:rpmisst~utJ~~J.§Q.. excl u_~jy~ ;~. .~.n.<i ~eGpnd, j:p._tariff
construGJtiQpJ.~/Wb~r_g, t4~ jurisdic:tiqn _of the Commission is
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a}§Q,Jz';.q~Jy~j v~, _b~ut QDly where the jssue for determination

is _J!tQX~ ..t1H!!t~9Jely ~Jl.lJ~~~t!Q!L9!J~W· It is helpful to have
this in mind in examining the decisions of state courts confronted with the problem, since the determination of
whether the court or the Interstate Commerce Commission
should make the initial decision of certain questions, is the
same in both fields.
In T. Mendelson Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 332 Pa.
'470, 2 A. 2d 820, (1838), shippers attempted to enjoin the
carrier from opening packaged perishable goods to determine the nature and extent of damage at the time of delivery, on the grounds that the practice was unreasonable.
The trial court denied the injunction on the ground the
exclusive jurisdiction was in the Interstate Commerce Commission. In affirming, the State Supreme Court, at page
822, said:
"The court below properly decided that the jurisdiction of the Commission is exclusive in matters
of this character. When rules, regulations and practices in interstate commerce are attacked as being
unreasonable in their operation, the law provides
a forum, the Interstate Commerce Commission, for
the settlement of this disputed question. That forum
must be resorted to before the courts can interfere.
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co.,
259 U. S. 285, 291, 42 S. Ct. 577, 66 L. Ed. 943.
Though state courts may assume equitable jurisdiction in proper cases, ·zchen they attempt to invade
a field occupied by Federal control under Federal
laws, they will be prohibited from entertaining jurisdiction. Under the facts as shown by the pleadings,
the Interstate Commerce Commission had jurisdiction. Here the duty devolves on the carrier to determine the 'practice.' The commission polices the
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carriers' rules and practices. It is an administrawhich_ ":tR.e. Commissi-on--ll.as_ _ -special
knowledge ;_v--~ ...t~~-h.:P.i<;al _ _ p:rqbJ~m. b~t.t~r ___ left __ to __ the
i:g!!i~t§~!l.4Y. qf ~ransportation specialists. The l~J;.IJ
nical nature of the subject, and the peculiar ability
of an administrative body to examine it, suffice as
a matter of public pDlicy to displace preliminary
court action. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

tiy~___mg._tter~.Qf_

r·

In Union Transfer Co. v. Renstrom, 151 Neb. 326, 37
N. W. 2d 383 (1949), a carrier commenced action for undercharges. The issue was whether the rate for finished or
unfinished stampings applied. The shipper claimed the
court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. However,
the court pointed out at page 386 :
"The Interstate Commerce Act, as adopted and
thereafter amended from time to time, never purported to exclusively confine the field of jurisdiction to the Interstate Commerce Commission, but as
a matter of fact was cumulative and actually reserved to the shipper and carrier all common law
and statutory remedies not repugnant to its provisions. Title 49, s. 22, U. S. C. A. of the Interstate
Commerce Act * * * "
"It is generally th~appli~a"Ql~xuJ~

~ha~~JW_h~n

r~_asol1a bl~ness, __ di.~-~;riminato_ry -~Char~G.te.r ,__Q.r.:.

the
valid-

ity of -~pprpved, .filed,_ -~nd publis_l,l~~- t~rjff' r~~-~~ ~s
not.__ as~~ileq, -~-~Q__ }!Q.__ question J;tff_~ctiD:g tb.~-- power
o:r_ administra~ive_ di~cretion or judgment of the Interstate Commerce Commission already exercised or
to be exercised is involved,. but the controversy
mereJy ip.v_9lve~ t~~· q:t!estion,_ of _w}leth.:~r. Qr ~~! the
carrier p~§. exacte<:l the rate prescribed in its tariff,
courts }1ave jurisd~ction o! the subjectm;;ttter. * * *"
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"* * * the

applicabl~-1~~----llla.intiff's

publi~l).ed tariff wer~_Gle_arJy_~unambiguDus.and,w.ith

out any~ p~cqJ!a..r_txa45i-.u_sage _1>.r~. D1~~:PJIJ.g. .. * * *
Such a case presented factual and legal questions in
nowise different from any other factual or legal
issue determinable by courts and juries, and courts
have original jurisdiction to try such cases."
The court found jurisdiction based upon the rationale
of the Great Northern case, while recognizing that state
courts do not have jurisdiction of those issues allocable
under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Walters v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 220 Ky. 813, 295
S. W. 1010 (1927), involved a question of a mathematical
calculation to determine the proper freight charges in dispute. The trial court dismissed the action upon the grounds
the questions involved were administrative ones, and therefore exclus~ve jurisdiction was in the Interstate Commerce
Commission. While recognizing the rule of primary jurisdiction, the Appellate Court reversed, holding that the only
problem involved was a determination of mathematical
computations and therefore resort to the Commission was
unnecessary.
The court's basis for arriving at this conclusion, stated
at page 1011, is as follows:
"In order, * * * for the question to be one
for the exclusive consideration by the Interstate
Commerce Commission there must be a disputed
question affecting the classification, and, resultingly,
the rates, and that question must be of such a nature as that courts and juries might reasonably disagree, and in th~ -~Q!.~!.llim.__~f__Fhich~ r~!!Ui!~... ~qe
e~ercise . Qf expert. _l.il.!QW ledge_ . Qf__ f~-~~~- ~~.Q pr~~tiG~~
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upon :wntch the classificat~o.ILia. based. It necessarily
follows, therefore, that, if the question to be solved
is not of the nature indicated and consists only in
mathematical calculations, it does not become one
exclusively for the Interstate Commerce Commission
to solve. If only a mathematical calculation will
solve the litigated question, there is nothing to
deprive the proper court, state or federal, of its
jurisdiction to find facts for the correct basis for
the calculation and give judgment accordingly. As
we have seen, there is no dispute in this case as to
the correct classification, or as to the rates applicable
to the classification. There is, therefore, no question
requiring expert knowledge, nor one about which
juries or courts might reasonably disagree."

Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Johns & Patterson,
201 Ky. 752, 258 S. W. 312 (1924), involved the question
of determining when used clothing ceased to be clothing and
became rags. The defendant carrier claimed the proper
classification and rating of the shipment involved administrative questions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. In considering this matter the court stated:
"This latter contention will be considered first,
since, if true, ordinary courts, both state and federal,
are without jurisdiction to determine the dispute."
(Emphasis added.)
Upon consideration the state appellate court determined
that the referral was necessary and therefore the trial court
had no jurisdiction.
The foregoing cases are sufficient, we believe, to illustrate the uniform application of federal primary jurisdiction by state courts. See also Hewett v. New York, N. H.
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& H. R. Co., 284 N. Y. 117, 29 N. E. 2d 641 (1940) ; Miller
v. Davis, 213 Ia. 1091, 240 N. W. 743 (1932); Chicago M.

St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Ricketson Min. Color Works, 218 Wis.
37, 259 N. W. 722 (1935) ; Knight v. Pennsylvania R. R.,
280 Ky. 191, 132 S. W. 2d 950 (1939) ; Beck & Gregg Hardware Co. v. Cook, 210 Ga. 608, 82 S. E. 2d 4 (1954); Illinois
Central R. Co. v. N. T. Reed Const. Co., 51 So. 2d 573 (Miss.,
1951) ; Texas Steel Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 70 S.
W. 2d 484 (Tex., 1934) ; and Anno. in 64 A. L. R. 333 et
seq. and 97 A. L. R. 406 et seq.

There is not a single state court case above cited, or
found by us, supporting the claim of appellant that the
state court should not or cannot make a referral to the
Interstate Commerce Commission when the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is applicable. On the contrary, they,
together with the Supreme Court pronouncements heretofore cited and considered, fully support the referral in this
case. In addition, the compelling reason for the establishment of primary jurisdiction in the Abilene case, i. e., uniformity is equally present here. See 11 Am. Jur., Commerce, Sec. 159.
Although in our court system there are separate state
and federal forums, in many areas they both apply the
same jurisprudence. It is true that fed.eral courts have
exclusive jurisdiction so far as the Constitution and the
statutes of Congress enacted pursuant thereto so provide,
and state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over matters
not falling within the jurisdiction of federal courts. However, there are many fields involving federal matters such
as interstate commerce, where there is concurrent juris-
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diction in state and federal tribunals. See 21 C. J. S.,
Courts, Sec. 524-526.
"It is a general rule that where no inconsistency
with the supremacy of the national government or
its official agencies is concerned, the state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts of
actions arising under federal statutes, just as federal courts, subject to limitations imposed by the
federal law itself, ha.ve concurrent jurisdiction with
state courts of actions arising under state law."
Thomas v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 127 Kan. 326,
273 P. 451, 64 A. L. R. 322, 328 (1929) ; see also,
Seaboard R. Co. v. Daniel, 333 U. S. 118, 68 S. Ct.
426, 92 L. Ed. 580 ( 1948) .
Neither party questions the basic concurrent j urisdiction in the state court in this case, but appellant alleges
that since the general jurisdiction of the state court has
been invoked, that court should not and, as a matter of law,
cannot refer any part of that ve.sted power to a federal
administrative agency. But this argument has a fatal weakness. The source of the original state court jurisdiction in
this roilier is not the S'tate.
~stafutes;-a8

Constitution-and

~~~~~-!E2l~~J~~I:{ilkn.liii~~,i;~C1D:ilii~P~~!::~-·

,9ql!¥E~~s,. t~titJ'., . ~~'"<tlM,~i.Y.t~t.right JR regl1l~.~" Jn.t.§r&iet~.,-~.?~:
.......merce.
-

Thus the power of the state court to step across
the threshhold and assume jurisdiction of any kind in these
cases is wholly dependent on the federal law.

..

"The power to regulate interstate commerce is
vested in the Congress by art. 1, § 8, par. 3 of the
Constitution of the United States. * * * The
historical background of this clause of the Constitution attests to the wisdom of thus giving the gen-
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eral Government supreme authority in this field.
* * * in section 22 of the original act, 49 U. S.
C. A., § 22, it is also provided that 'nothing in this
chapter contained shall in any way abridge or alter
the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition
to such remedies'. Thus the Congress plainly and
unmistakably expresses its will and intention that
rights of parties arising in interstate commerce
transactions may be protected by the courts of the
land, both Federal and State, so long as action in the
courts are not inconsistent with the provisions of
the act." Beck & Gregg Hardware Co. v. Cook, supra,
at 7.
Simply
by repealil).g S_ection. . . 22 of the Interstate
Com-- - - "
..
IIl~rce_ Ac~, _Qongre~§~C91!LcL~9J:nPletely__remQY~L concurrent
jurisdiction from.~t-~t~- C.QYrt~ iiJ: the fiel_(l _of inter~tate commerce*, and t~erefore the contention that the state court
is being asked to abdicate some of its original power is
wholly without merit. And, in granting to the state courts
concurrent jurisdiction to deal with interstate commerce
matters under Section 22, the state courts must have implied authority to fully perform their assignments by,
among other things, referring matters of an appropriate
nature to the Commission. Hence, any questions of invasion
and abdication of state court power are not involved.
-~----

---·--
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This is not a reference to an administrative body outside the scope of the state judicial system (App. Br. 37).
It is a reference to a federal agency by a state court acting
within the scope of the federal judicial system. Congress
has delegated to the Commission the authority to determine
*See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Co., supra, at page 130.
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and decide matters within its primary jurisdiction and has
delegated to the courts the right to entertain other actions
involving interstate commerce. United States v. Garner,
134 F. Supp. 16 (E. D., N. C., 1955).
Therefore it would appear that Point IV of Appellant's
Brief and the cases cited and discussed thereunder, are
without application to any issue actually involved in these
cases.
Any colJrt,, construing _an_interstate tariff, "w.be.the~ .
it . be stat~--Cl.~~ ~9~JJ!!~mu_st. J!lill!Y tll~~-.Jt_ppli@Pl~ _ _ _f_~~ler:al
law as outlin~~"Qr. the JJ:pJt~!!" . StJ!t~~-- ~qprero~ ._Qourt. __Gr.fHJt
Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., supra, at 290;
Bernstein Bros. Pipe & Machine Co. v. Denver & R. G. W.
R. Co., 193 F. 2d 441 (C. C. A.-10, 1951). The basic purpose underlying this requirement is to insure uniform
application of substantive rules throughout the entire field
governed by federal law, regardless of whether the state
or the federal forum is initially invoked. The issue presented in these cases goes one step beyond the mere application of federal substantive law. Here we have._a...fe.der.al
jurisdictionaL _QQG.triP-t\ .and... therefore, -~~,- fortiori, the state
court m,ust _.follQW jt.
HThe doctrine of primary jurisdiction thus does
'more than prescribe the mere procedural timetable
of the law suit. It is a doctrine allocating the lawmaking power over certain aspects' of commercial
relations. 'It transfers from the court to agency the
power to determine' some of the incidents of such
relations." United States v. Western Pac. R. Co.,
supra, at 65. (Emphasis added.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32
A converse situation to these cases is diversity of
citizenship actions. Since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.
S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938), federal courts
have been bound to follow controlling rules of substantive
law as declared by the state legislatures or highest state
courts in all diversity cases, unless a Federal Constitution
or statutory question is involved. Thus the ultimate decision of the case reached in the federal court is no different
than if the case had been concluded in the state court. The
same reasoning has equal force here. The state court's
handling of a referral under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction must be the same as the corresponding handling in
the federal court.

The doctrine of referral by federal courts to state administrative bodies to determine questions within their
particular field was recognized by the federal district court
in the state of Washington in Ellison v. Rayonier, supra.
In that case actions were commenced by various tide land
owners against a pulp and mill operator to recover damages for deterioration and death of oysters caused by water
pollution. The basis of the court's jurisdiction was diversity
of citizenship. The mill operator claimed that under the
Washington Water Pollution Control Act primary jurisdiction to determine standards of actionable pollution of state
waters was vested in the Pollution Control Commission
provided for in the Act.
The federal court, applying Washington substantive
law as it was bound to do, agreed, and there was no question
that the federal court should not or could not make the
referral to the state agency. Thus, even the federal courts
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find no barrier to recognition of a state administrative
agency when the states doctrine of primary jurisdiction
applies. See also: Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Sauk River
Lumber Co., 82 F. 2d 519 (C. C. A.-9, 1936).
Proper heeg_l!!q§.t.J>jL,giYJm.. ~to ". th~~ pronou~11-G~mEID1s .ot
t}le JJ.nl~!l __States .. S_q.Jn~J~ID~.~~QQ:urt _<;oncerning o.th~ . .<l9_ctr~n.~
of prin:1.ary ju.risdiction. since it is...the~ paramount authority
over ~l!_legal . . m.~t!~r~- pred~~~te.<t.<?n __the. _Feq~raJ Con_~titu
tj_gn ..~J.Ul S.tatut.es~ _And, wh~re it has spoken, its, W()rds_ are
~ only-~ntitlEl~-.JE'"...,S"~~- deJe.renGe, .Jhey ar.~,--~,gn:tl.tled _t_Q
"absolute 2~c~~~~"~~e." Knight v. Pennsylvania R. R., supra,
at 953; South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U. S. 412, 420, 53 S.
Ct. 667, 77 L. Ed. 1292 (1933). From Abilene to Western
Pacific the Supreme Court has reiterated time and time
again that when the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
applicable, the exclusive jurisdiction of the question to be
referred is in the federal administrative agency. The state
or federal court of general jurisdiction is therefore not
concerned with discretion or desire, and once the determination has been made that primary jurisdiction is applicable, a duty to refer arises. The court's failure to do so
would render its own determination nugatory and void,
because it has no authority to decide that question.
Appellant argues that the state court cannot make the
referral because it has no control over the Commission.
While it is true that there is no direct control by the state
court over the agency, it does not follow that the court
cannot make the referral. Erimary jurisdiction is not coneern~t<.t~.wit.!L~Qntrol by the. .Gou:rt over the agency _to_ .which
referrals are rna_d.e, . because _the power of determination
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of,. the

_g_JJ.eilion~x:eferx:ed--is~notin-=the~court. For example,

the Court of Clail!l~E~E. no cont~9l. oy~_r the c!~~~!"~!~!~ Q_qmmerc~ Commissiol!..in._th.!LWJ3~.t.~xn. Pacific case. ~In..addition,
adequ~t~, rem~d_i~SJlr~ available .against .any,_federaLagency
in the fed~ra,l court~_ to insur~~t.h.~t.-~th.ey .will.. prop,er.ly ~I>~r
form in all referral matters.
--~-~ .... -;:,·l'f"'".-.;..'-·-~·.o...-;f

~·

-_ . . ; .

- - ......, ..•.

The state court did not order the Interstate Commerce
Commission to make the determination (App. Br. 37) ; it
simply ordered referral of "questions involving construction
to the Interstate Commerce Commission for answer and
determination by that body" (R. 42). Any Interstat~t.Com
~-~~~"-"QQ.!!!Il!t§..~iQIL determination ~W9J!ld . tb_eJ!,JJ.e.-. based on
an j~~!!d~p_ipetit!Q11 by ~th~. responQ.~:uL!or _a declaratory
order pursuant t.Q Sectio;n 5 (d) Q(Jb.~- ~<J.min~str~tive J>rocedl]J;_~ Act. ( 5 .. V..~!_,Q.~A.;:. Sec. JO_Q~~~-J-~1-·l~ _
.
From. the foregoing reasons and authorities we conclude that whether Union Pacific Railroad Company commenced these proceedings in the United States District
Court under 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1337* *, rather than in the
state court as it did in these cases, makes no material difference on the question of referral to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the doctrine of federal primary
jurisdiction.

E.

Referral to the Interstate Commerce Commission is not barred by the Statute of Limita-

*See Arizona Sand & Rock Co. v. SoutlH rn Pacific Co., 280 I. C. C. 285
(1951).
**Bernstein Bros. Pipe <-<'~ ll!achine Co. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co.,
supra; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Rice, 247 U. S. 201, 38 S. Ct. 429, 62
L. Ed. 1071, ( 1918) ; c.f. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. TFillard
Mirror Co., 160 F. Supp. 895 (W. D., Ark., 1958).
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tions under 49 U. S. C. A. 16 (3) even though
more than two years have elapsed since the
causes of action accrued.
Little need be said on this point. In United States v.
Western Pac. R. Co., supra, the Supreme Court treats the
matter of referral and the two-year statute of Limitations:
"Section 16 (3) does not deal with referral
questions to the Commission incident to judicial
proceedings. On its face it has to do only with the
commencement of actions or reparation proceedings
before the Commission. There is therefore no language which militates against the conclusion that
the Statute does not apply to referrals." Id., at 72.
See also: Northwestern Auto Parts Co. v. Chicago, B.
& Q. R. Co., supra; United States v. T. I. M. E., Inc., 252
F. 2d 178 (C. C. A.-5, 1958) ; and United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 352 U. S. 77, 81, 77 S. Ct. 172, 1 L. Ed.
2d 140 (1956).
POINT II.
THE NECESSITY FOR DETERMINATION OF
FACTS FROM EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AND
THE PROBLEMS OF TARIFF CONSTRUCTION PRESENT ISSUES IN THESE CAUSES
WITHIN THE SPECIAL COMPETENCE OF
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION, AND THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY ALLOCATED THE ISSUES IN THE
SUITS.
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A.

The questions referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission for construction raise issues of transportation policy which must be
considered by the Commission in the interests
of uniform and expert administration.

Referral of the questions of tariff construction to the
Interstate Commerce Commission by the District Court is
based upon the holdings of three Supreme Court cases:
Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. American Tie Co., 234 U. S. 138,
34 S. Ct. 885, 58 L. Ed. 1255 ( 1914) ; Great Northern Ry.
Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., supra; and United States
v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra. These cases clearly dispose
of Appellant's arguments that the issues of tariff construction in the present cases are within the jurisdiction of the
court.
In the Tie case the shipper sought damages from the
carrier on the ground that its refusal to furnish cars for
oak railroad cross ties was the cause of I osing a contract
with a third party. Shipper claimed the ties should have
been shipped under a through rate provided in the carriers
tariff T&P No. 8500-H, applying to lumber. The railroad
contended the tariff did not apply to cross ties and therefore it could not legally ~ship the ties under that tariff. It
asked the trial court for a dismissal on the grounds the
court did not have jurisdiction inasmuch as the sole issue
was the construction of the tariff and the Interstate Commerce Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to determine
that issue. The motion was denied, and on appeal assigned
as error.
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In reversing, the Supreme Court stated at page 146:

"* * * It is not disputable that the pivotal
question in the case was whether oak railway crossties were included in the filed tariff * * * and
so far as the solution of that inquiry depended upon
the views of men engaged in the lumber and railroad
business * * * it is equally indisputable that
there was an irreconcilable conflict. And this conflict at once leads to a consideration of the princi pie
which dominates the controversy and upon which its
decison therefore depends.

"* * *

it is * * * clear that the controversy as to whether the lumber tariff included
crossties was one primarily to be determined by the
Commission in the exercise of its power concerning
tariffs and the authority to regulate conferred upon
it by the statute. Indeed, we think it is indisputable
that that subject is directly controlled by the authorities which establish that for the preservation
of the uniformity which it was the purpose of the
Act to Regulate Commerce to secure, the courts may
not as an original question exert authority over subjects which primarily come with (in) the jurisdiction of the Commission. (Citing cases.)
"The foundation upon which the doctrine rests
* * * is the necessity of a uniform enforcement
of the Interstate Commerce Act and the danger of
diversity and conflict arising if questions concerning the existence of tariffs or their reasonableness,
of discriminations and preferences were left to be
originally determined by courts of general j urisdiction, thus giving rise to the possibility of one rule
in one jurisdiction and another in another * * *."
"The effect of the holding is clear: The courts
must not only refrain from making tariffs, but,
under certain circumstances, must decline to con-
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strue them as well." United States v. Western Pac.
R. Co., supra, at 65.
In Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co.,
supra, at 293, Justice Brandeis analyzes the Tie case. He
points out that it was a dispute as to whether the word
"lumber" was used in its ordinary meaning or in a peculiar
meaning, and therefore the question was not one of legal
construction but of fact, upon which there was "irreconcilable conflict" among "the views of men engaged in the
lumber and railroad business." Brandeis concluded that
referral of the question of fact to the Commission was necessary "to ensure uniformity."
Part of the dispute in this case is whether the words
of the transit tariff are used in their ordinary meaning or
in a peculiar meaning. The filing of the lawsuits and the
objections to referral by the shipper alone show that the
views of men engaged in the fabrication-in-transit and railroad business are in "irreconcilable conflict." Under such
circumstances extrinsic evidence will be necessary to determine whether peculiar or extraordinary meanings are
used, and construction of the transit tariff must therefore,
"to ensure uniformity," be referred to the Commission.

Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co.,
supra, is a landmark decision on the question of interstate
tariff construction. The holding was adhered to by the
Supreme Court in the Western Pacific case, where it was
described as a "particularization" of the circumstances in
the Tie case.
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There a shipper commenced action in a state court to
recover charges exacted by the carrier under a reconsignment or diversion tariff. Plaintiff had shipped corn to
Willmar, Minnesota, for inspection, and then rebilled the
shipments to Anoka, a station beyond. Naming Willmar in
the bills of lading as destination point was to facilitate
inspection of the ladings as required by law. After inspection, disposition orders were given and the original bills of
lading exchanged for billing to Anoka. For this exchange
the railroad added a charge of $5 per car pursuant to Rule
10 of its tariff. The rule provided that "if a car is diverted,
reconsigned or reforwarded * * * after arrival of the
car at original destination, * * * a charge of $5.00 per
car will be made * * *" The shipper claimed to be
within an exception to Rule 10, which provided that it would
not apply to "grain * * * carloads, held in cars on
track for inspection and disposition orders incident thereto
at billed destination or at point intermediate thereto." The
issue was to determine whether Rule 10 or the exception
applied, a question solely of construction. Over the carrier's
objection the trial court construed the exception to mean
that cars were exempt if held on the track at billed destination for inspection and for "disposition orders" incident
thereto. It held that the disposition order could be a reconsignment to another destination and forwarding to Anoka
was such a disposition.
The Supreme Court, in affirming the state court, held
that under the facts of this case the issue of tariff construction could be decided by the court and it did not have to
be referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission because
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there was no dispute concerning the facts and the words
of the tariff were used in "their ordinary meaning." Thus
the construction presented a question "solely of law" and,
like the construction of any other legal document in dispute,
was a proper question for the court.
"Here no fact, evidential or ultimate, is in controversy; and there is no occasion for the exercise
of administrative discretion. The task to be performed is to determine the meaning of words of the
tariff which were used in their ordinary sense and
to apply that meaning to the undisputed facts. That
question was solely one of construction; and preliminary resort to the Commission was, therefore,
unnecessary." ld., 294.
Deciding the issue of whether "disposition order" meant
a "reconsignment" in the Great Northern case required only
three readily available sources of information: first, the
tariff ; second, the dictionary ; and third, the abstract rules
of legal construction.*
Brandeis then considers the problem where the issue
is more than one "solely of law" and at page 291, states:
"* * * But words are used sometimes in a
peculiar meaning. Then extrinsic evidence may be
necessary to determine the meaning of words appearing in the document. This is true where technical words or phrases not commonly understood
are employed. Or extrinsic evidence may be necessary to establish a usage of trade or locality which
attaches provisions not expressed. in the language
*Another example is the Utah case of TV estern Pac. R. Co. v. Wasatch
Chemical Co., 117 Utah 411, 217 P. 2d 371 (1950), where the court
determines the 1neaning of words by merely referring to Webster. In
addition, the question of primary jurisdiction was never considered.
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of the instrument. Where such a situation arises,
and the peculiar meaning of words, or the existence
of a usage, is proved by evidence, the function of
construction is necessarily preceded by the determination of the matter of fact. * * * where
the document to be construed is a tariff of an interstate carrier, and before it can be construed it is
necessary to determine upon evidence the peculiar
meaning of words or the existence of incidents alleged to be attached by usage to the transaction, the
preliminary determination must be made by the
Commission; and not until this determination has
been made, can a court take juris diction of the controversy. If this were not so, that uniformity which
it is the purpose of the Commerce Act to secure could
not be attained. * * *"
It is difficult to imagine issues so ripe for reference
as the ones before us. U. P. Tariff 7188-P is replete with
"technical words or phrases not commonly understood."
Only a casual reading of the applicable Items of the tariff
is necessary to forcefully illustrate the complexity and technicality of the document. For these rna tters extrinsic evidence for proper determination is indispensable to insure
the uniformity "which it is the purpose of the Commerce
Act to secure."
Appellant states that "Brandeis rather effectively does
away with the uniformity argument" (App. Br. 14) by his
language appearing in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants'
Elevator Co., at 290, as follows:
"This argument [for uniformity] is unsound.
It is true that uniformity is the paramount purpose
of the Commerce Act. But it is not true that uniformity in construction of a tariff can be attained
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only through a preliminary resort to the Commission to settle the construction in dispute. Every
question of the construction of a tariff is deemed
a question of law; and where the question concerns
an interstate tariff it is one of federal law. If the
parties properly preserve their rights, a construction
given by any court, whether it be federal or state,
may ultimately be reviewed by this court either on
writ of error or on writ of certiorari; and thereby
uniformity in construction may be secured. Hence,
the attainment of uniformity does not require that
in every case where the construction of a tariff is
in dispute, there shall be a preliminary resort to the
Commission." (Emphasis added.)
An examination of the case reveals that this language
is only applicable to questions solely of law, because uniformity may be secured through Supreme Court review.
However, where facts must be found and specialized judgment is necessary, the unifying influence of that Court cannot be reached and therefore preliminary referral to the
Commission is necessary to insure proper uniformity. See
Davis, supra, at 666.
In United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra, the
United States shipped a number of carloads of steel aerial
bomb cases filled with napalm gel, which is gasoline thickened by the addition of aluminum soap powder. The carriers involved, billed the government at the first-class rate
established in Item 1820 of Consolidated Freight Classification No. 17 for "incendiary bombs." The Government
contended that since the commodity did not include the
burster and fuse and thus 'vas not a completed bomb, the
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shipments should be carried at the fifth-class rate applicable to gasoline in steel drums.
Action was originally commenced in the Court of
Claims under the Tucker Act, where the court entered summary judgment for the carriers upon determining that the
shipments in question were "incendiary bombs."
Although the parties had not raised the issue of tariff
construction, the court inquired into that aspect of the
decision and "concluded that in the circumstances * * *
presented the question of tariff construction, as well as
that of the reasonableness of the tariff as applied, was
within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission." I d., at 63.
The determination that the Commission should first
pass upon the construction of the disputed tariff, was based
upon "whether the question raises issues of transportation
policy which ought to be considered by the Commission in
the interests of a uniform and expert administration of the
regulatory scheme laid down by that Act." I d., at 65.
The court turned for its answer to that question to the
holdings of the Tie and Great Northern cases :

"* * * Where the question is simply one of
construction, the courts may pass on it as an issue
'solely of law.' But where words in a tariff are
used in a peculiar or technical sense, and where
extrinsic evidence is necessary to determine their
meaning or proper application, so that 'the inquiry
is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters,' then the issue of tariff application must
first go to the Commission. The reason is plainly set
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forth: Such a 'determination is reached ordinarily
upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the
adequate appreciation of which acquaintance with
many intricate facts of transportation is indispensable ; and such acquaintance is commonly to be found
only in a body of experts.' * * * We must
therefore decide whether a determination of the
meaning of the term 'incendiary bomb' in Item 1820
involves factors 'the adequate appreciation of which'
presupposes an 'acquaintance with many intricate
facts of transportation.' We conclude that it does."
Id., at 66.
There were actually two matters which were initially
for the Commission's determination: first, the issue of
tariff construction and, second, the issue of the reasonableness of the tariff as applied. The court reasoned that both
the technical meaning of the phrase "incendiary bomb,"
and the reasonableness of the rate were dependent upon
the same extrinsic background factors and were therefore
so intertwined that a single investigation into the same
factors was determinative of both issues. Thus, "complex
and technical cost allocation" had to be considered not only
in determining the rate, but also in determining the meaning of "incendiary bomb," to which the rate would apply.
"In other words, there were obviously commercial reasons why a higher tariff was set for incendiary bombs than for, say, lumber. It therefore follows that the decision whether a certain item was
intended to be covered by the tariff for incendiary
bombs [a question of construction] involves an intimate knowledge of these very reasons themselves.
Whether steel casings filled zuith napalm gel are incendiary bombs is, in this context, more than simply
a question of reading the tariff language o1· apply-
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ing abstract 'rules' of construction. For the basic
issue is how far the reasons justifying a high rate
for the carriage of extra-hazardous objects were
applicable to the instant shipment. Do the factors
which make for high costs and therefore high rates
on incendiary bombs also call for a high rate on steel
casings filled with napalm gel? To answer that
question there must be close familiarity with these
factors. Such familiarity is possessed not by the
courts but by the agency which had the exclusive
power to pass on the rate in the first instance. And,
on the other hand, to decide the question of the scope

of this tariff without consideration of the factors
and purposes underlying the terminology employed
would make the process of adjudication little more
than an exe?'"cise in semantics." ld., at 66, 67. (Emphasis added.)
The court aptly concludes:

"* * * For the court here to undertake to
fix the limits of the tariff's application * * *
is tantamount to engaging in judicial guesswork."
ld., at 68.
There being no question that the determination of the
reasonableness of a tariff is always within the exclusive
primary jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the basic precedent established in the Western Pacific
case is in the field of tariff construction. The opinion itself
cites only those cases dealing with that issue, and the analysis of the court is based wholly thereon.
The issues in the cases presently before the Court are
as properly referable to the Interstate Commerce Commission as was the issue in the Western Pacific case. The
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terminology of the tariff is highly technical and numerous
words and phrases are in dispute. For example, in Item
100, there is dispute over the meaning of "identity," "the
integrity of the through rate" and "substitution of structural iron or steel"; in Item 5, there is a dispute over "reworking or fabricating"; in Item 125, of "transit material
and unfabricated articles." This is only a partial list in
the overall disagreement as to the proper construction of
the tariff.
In these cases the reasons for the existence of the
doctrine are readily apparent, and the purposes it serves
will be aided by its application. !i)~.bri~tion_ in_ .tDtusi.l~
sk~1 P~Q!liJ.~t~~ i§-=~n _irn~buslne~~§ ~an.UJJigbJ~. . ~ompetitiy~-~-

<

•••

Th~!~fo~e

throg_g}!o_~t JJJ._~

of all

qn.Jfgrro __ _t;r~~tm~:nt ___Qf _,._~~-c_s}lippers._.

_countrY. _r~qutr~.s

a uJl!f.()rm )pte:rpr~!~t~2n

fabricati.Qnd.U::.transit_J.ar~..a.llow ~the~ effect

g~ v~B---~~ cllJar!.!!~---jg___ }?_~ _. l;>~~~g~"Jl~Qn __ Y!!:riaJ~l.~.. tind._ing&~~Jl!

fact by courts, would_ defeat Jhe uniforill.i.tJk_ sought .. hy:.ihe
Inter!?_t_~~~--- 9o~merce _A_~t.

_Therefore su~lL. lJ;I].i~9rmity__ can
only ..!?.e_. q__~c._Qml)Jlah.e.d_b~L-~eferring.. suc.h.jssues~~to the -Commissiqp._. In a_qqitJo.!! t2~P~<2.~~!!~- !-IE.~~J;~!~EE-~~8~-:r~~ ~.9~---· .
plex and tec.~,I,l~c~!-~9-.()~UP.en~-- ( ev~:n- app~_l!~nt ~o;t1c~g~~ttll~
tariff is complex (App. Br. 23), there is need J9r the ~ssist-

or

ance
t_h9_~~ _h..~Y.!P.-K ..'-~!!.!t ~cqu~_intapce witb many int;rjca,te
facts of transnortatiQJL.iO.~&..UPllly_their specialized._ competell:<;~ . ~ll9: -.~)fpertn~~§~ .. ';I.]1u§ _the _cqns~ruG_t~Q!t_oi _thJ~Lt~_:rj"ft

rais.~~ ql!:~~~91?-§~,_:w,:pJc~ _ LQ!!gJ~.t J._q__p~-~9.ll~Jd.~red by the Commjs~!.Q_P-:_. i!.:l:.1h~. trtte.r~st§_gf.. ~-_"uniform

.and expert administrati9n _Qf. t.hf3. r.~S".t1~atory_ scheme laid down by t:h~.-~~t."
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Returning to the Brandeis test: Could this transit
Lriff be properly construed by simply referring to the
Lriff, the English language and the general abstract rules
[ legal construction? We cannot see how. Although a tar:f is made up of words intending to convey some basic
lnclusion or conclusions, it is not, as Justice Harlan states
1 the Western Pacific case, "an abstraction." Extrinsic
~idence is necessary to establish the following facts: the
roper meaning of the technical terminology, to determine
rhat factors were considered in drafting and publishing
.1e tariff, to examine its basic purpose and to determine
.1e Commission's reasons for granting the tariff privilege
1itially. Only with this background in mind can it be fairly
etermined to what extent the fabricator is required or not
equired to work the article, the extent to which he may or
1ay not make substitutions of inbound and outbound artiles, his rights to store the articles listed in Item 5 and
rhether he may wrap pipe fabricated from steel sheets at
h.e transit point. To construe the tariff without making
uch findings "is tantamount to engaging in judicial guessrork." United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra, 68.
See also: New York, Susquehanna & Western R. Co .
. Follmer, 254 F. 2d 510 (C. C. A.-3, 1958) ; United States
. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., supra; United States v. Chesa~eake & 0. R. Co., 242 F. 2d 732 (C. C. A.-4, 1957) ; lnter,ational Pacific Co. v. Delaware & H. R. Corp., 73 F. Supp.
0 (N.D., N.Y., 1938) ; Director General (of Railroads) v.
"'iscoe Co., 254 U. S. 498, at 504, 41 S. Ct. 151, 65 L. Ed.
72 (1921) ; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States,

upra; United States v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.,
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supra; Norge Corp. v. Long Island R. Co., 77 F. 2d 312 (C.
C. A.-2, 1935) ; Porto Transportation, Inc., v. Consolidated
Diesel Electric Corp., 20 F. R. D. 1 (S. D., N. Y., 1956);
Armour & Co. v. Chicago M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 188 F. 2d
603 (C. C. A.-7, 1951) ; Schwartzman v. United Air Lines
Trans. Corp., 6 F. R. D. 517 (D., Neb., 1947) ; 15 C. J. S.,
Commerce, Sec. 143.
Appellant is concerned with the effect the Utah Court
may give to a determination of the Interstate Commerce
Commission of the five issues of tariff construction listed
in the order of referral (App. Br. 7, 8). Since the trial court
has not yet given any effect to an Interstate Commerce Commission determination, the matter is premature and is not
before the court on this appeal. However, if appellant is
merely seeking information as to respondent's position on
this matter, we are happy to oblige.
There is really no "mischief" in the order of referral.
Its form is designed to present the issues to the Commission
in the proper legal manner. It is a request by the state court
for a determination of certain questions. This will involve
a "report * * * on the issues of tariff interpretation
and issues of fact" (R. 43). Upon referral to the Commission the introduction of extrinsic evidence and findings
will be necessary before the interpretation of the tariff
itself may be accomplished. Thus both findings of fact and
conclusions of law would be returned to the trial court.
We cannot say what effect the trial court would give
to such findings and conclusions. Precedent should control
such effect. However, findings . .l;>Y ,t)l~ Cgmmi~~~QA~~Jlll;
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I!Qrted by substantial evidence, are binding on ...11.1~ court.
Hudson & Manhattan R. Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 98,
·'
61 S. Ct. 884, 85 L. Ed. 1212 (1941) ; Interstate Commerce
Commf~sion v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 1129,
88 L. Ed. 1420 (1944); Crancer v. Lowden, 315 U. S. 631,
62 S. Ct. 763, 86 L. Ed. 1077 (1942); Chicago, M. St. P. &
P. R. Co. v. Allouette Peat Products, 253 F. 2d 449 (C. C.
""
A.-9, 1957). Conclusiol}~ .9( law, on.~_the ot:her ha:nd, altho_ygh_ entitled ..to respectful ~consideration by_ the court,
do not _]HJ.Ve the.. same finality as .. finding~ of fact, and the
court is not_]Jou.~_<J thereby. Brown Lumber Co. v. L. & N.
R. Co., 299 U. S. 393, 57 S. Ct. 265, 81 L. Ed. 301 (1937) ;
Levinson v. Spector Motor Co., 330 U. S. 649, 672, 67 S. Ct.
931, 91 L. Ed. 1158 ( 194 7) ; Chicago M. & St. P. & P. R.
Co. v. Allouette Peat Products, supra; Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Corneli Seed Co., 161 F. Supp. 52, (D., Idaho,
1958).
B.

Suspension of the judicial process and retention of jurisdiction by the district court for
all purposes was proper since, upon return,
the court must determine all remaining issues
of fact and law, a ward damages, if proper,
and enforce judgments, if any.

Retention of jurisdiction by the state court rather than
dismissal of the proceeding depends upon whether any
"purpose will * * * be served to hold the * * *
action in abeyance in the District Court * * *." F(Jjf'
East Conference v. United States, supra, at 577. If the only
issue is entirely within the scope of the agency's dominion,
the matter should be dismissed; however, if there are certain
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issues within the overall suit which are within the power of
the court to adjudicate, or where the dismissal may affect
a remedy upon which the cause of action is based, a stay
is proper. General American Tank Car Corp. v. ElDorado
Terminal Co., supra, at 433; United States v. Western Pac.
R. Co., supra, at 64; United States v. Kansas City Southern
Ry. Co., supra, at 769.
In the cases before us there are issues within the general jurisdiction of the state court, such as, when and where
each carload was shipped and when each arrived at point of
destination. There is an issue in each cause of action as to
whether or not the Statute of Limitations has ·run on the
carrier's claim. There is the matter of awarding and
enforcing judgments in favor of respondent, if proper.
Under these circumstances a "purpose will be served" in
holding the actions in abeyance, and the trial court properly
did so.
CONCLUSION
The District Court committed no error In referring
the five questions of tariff construction to the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Its action should be affirmed on
this interlocutory appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
SCOTT M. MATHESON, JR.,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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APPENDIX
Items 5, 60, 65, 80, 100, 110, 120 and 125
of U. P. R. R. Tariff No. 7188-P, with supplements

Item No.5
(Effective May 15, 1952)
FABRICATION AND TREATING OF
STRUCTURAL IRON OR STEEL AND OTHER
COMMODITIES IN TRANSIT.
APPLICATION
CarJoad §h!r>m~nts of .!rP.n.Pr.,~t~~l, viz.:
Angles, Bars, Beams, Channels, Columns, Culverts, set-up or knocked down, Ells, Girders, Masts,
Plates, Rods (Except Coiled Rods), Sheets, Tees,
and Zees, Tubular Iron or Steel (See Exception 1),
castings (when shipped in the rough not fitted,
painted, Japanned, bronzed, coppered, acid coppered,
plated, tinned or galvanized), Iron or Steel Articles
to be converted into Iron or Steel Roofing or Siding,
Iron or Steel Ceiling, and Iron or Steel Shingles, and
other Iron and Steel Articles, may_ b~ _stopped in
tra.nsi t ..a.t..§t.a.tiQU.S ._on ~.tb~~---1J nion . f~-~_jfjc Railr_q~q,
viz.: . (J) _S.t~:tJQ.nsNos. 2390 Ogden, Utah and 5560
Salt __ . ~~~e..City:, Utah to . 9580 Huntington, _Ore.,
16670 Ironton, Utah, to 16715 Cutler, Utah, and
1678_Q_J.\lQunt, Utah, to 16807, Officer,. Utah, inclusive. wh~:P. .suclt.stations a:re ,.<;li;r~_ctly . inte:rme<i.i~t~
between point of origin a_ud finaL destination, for
the purpose .Qf ~r~w<;n;~,i.:Q.g __ Q:r _fapri.c~t~ng,_ subject to
the rules and conditions published in Items 10 to 130,
inclusive, as follows:
Provisions of this item will not apply where the
transit point and destination are both within the
same switching limits.
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Iron or steel pipe, fabricated from iron or steel
plate or sheet, standard gauge No. 16 or thicker,
may be coated with or dipped in asphalt or a compound having tar or asphalt base, only at the fabricating point. The weight of the asphalt or compound
applied to the pipe at the fabricating point to be
treated as non-transit material and subject to the
existing rules governing non-transit material as provided in the fabricating in transit tariffs (See Exceptions 2 and 3) .

*

*

*

EXCEPTION !-Threading or rethreading in
transit of Iron or Steel Pipe or Tubular Iron or Tubular Steel will not be permitted under the provisions
of this tariff.
EXCEPTION 2-Iron or Steel Pipe moving
under rates named in Pacific Southcoast Freight
Bureau Tariff No. 260-B, Agent J. P. Haynes, I. C.
C. No. 1552, from points taking Groups 2, 2-A or 4
rates may be stopped at Salt Lake City, Utah, for
privilege of dipping or wrapping. The weight of
the asphalt andjor other materials applied to the
pipe at transit point to be treated as non-transit
material.
EXCEPTION 3-Iron or Steel Pipe moving
under rates named in Pacific Southcoast Freight
Bureau Tariff No. 2-K, Agent J. P. Haynes, I. C. C..
No. 1362, from points taking Group 5, 5-A, 5-B or
5-C rates, may be stopped at Salt Lake City, Utah,
for dipping or wrapping. The weight of the asphalt
andjor other materials applied to the pipe at transit
point shall be treated as non-transit material.
EXCEPTION 4-Effective December 30, 1953.
Carload shipments of Iron or Steel Pipe may be
stopped in transit at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
U. P. R. R. intermediate (see also Items 15 to 50
inclusive) between point of origin and point of des-
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iii
tination for the purpose of dipping or wrapping at
a transit charge of 31/2 cents per 100 pounds. The
weight of asphalt or compound, also the wrapping
applied to the pipe at Salt Lake City, Utah to be
treated as non-transit material as provided in Item
125. ( 98-580-2.)

Item No. 60
(Effective May 15, 1952)
TRANSIT CHARGE
On shipments accorded transit privileges under
this tariff, an additional charge of 31~ cents per
100 lbs., will be made for the transit privilege, this
charge to be assessed on the actual outbound weight
of the transit portion of the shipment, or on the
minimum carload weight applicable to the transit
portion of the shipment, whichever is higher.

Item No. 65
(Effective May 15, 1952)
PROTECTION OF THROUGH RATE
Except as provided in Note 1, the through rate
to be applied is that in effect on the outbound transited article on the date shipment left point of origin
from point of origin to the transit destination or
from the point of origin to the transit station or
from the transit station to the transit destination,
whichever is highest, plus transit charge as per Item
60, except that where the rate from point of origin
to transit destination, on the inbound material to
transit point, in effect on date shipment left point
of origin, is higher than any of the above rates such
rate will apply, plus transit charge as per Item 60.
In no case will the total charge exceed the combination of tariff rates to and from transit station.
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The minimum carload weight to be used is that
governing the through rate applied.
NOTE 1-0n export shipments rate to apply
will be the through rate on the finished product from
point of origin to port of export, in effect on date
shipment leaves point of origin, plus transit charge
of 314 cents per 100 pounds.

Item No. 80
(Effective May 15, 1952)
RESHIPMENT FROM PROPER WAREHOUSE
These rules will apply only when the commodities are reshipped from the warehouse, storeroom or
manufacturing plant into which they were originally
unloaded, except in the case of the actual transfer
of the commodity, in which case the seller must
certify on the back of the tonnage credit slip that
the commodity was actually transferred, giving the
date and method of transfer.

Item No. 100
(Effective May 15, 1952)
PRESERVING IDENTITY OF IRON AND STEEL
The identity of structural iron or steel, as defined in Item 5, unloaded in a warehouse, storeroom
or at a manufacturing plant, cannot be preserved,
and the integrity of the through rate being preserved
by the requirements as to the surrender of inbound
tonnage credit slips, verification of records or receipts and shipments by authorized representatives
of the railroad, substitution of structural iron or
steel as defined in Item 5, originating on one line,
for a like commodity originating on other lines, will
be permitted.
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Item No. 110
(Effective May 15, 1952)
SUBSTITUTION OF INBOUND FREIGHT BILLS
AND TONNAGE CREDIT SLIPS
At time billing instructions are given for shipment from transit station, unexpired inbound billing shall be surrendered to the carriers' agent. When
such billing is not surrendered, flat rate from transit station will apply.
To correct errors due to surrender of non-applicable freight bills or tonnage credit slips, proper
freight bills or tonnage credit slips may be exchanged
for those surrendered.
No readjustment may be made in cases where
the freight bills or tonnage credit slips originally
surrendered were applicable or where there was no
surrender of billing.
Non-applicable freight bills or tonnage credit
slips are those, the surrender of which does not result in the shipper securing the benefit of a lower
rate than the flat rate from transit point to final
destination.

Item No. 120
(Effective May 15, 1952)
TRANSFER OF TONNAGE OR OWNERSHIP
Freight bills on commodities to be accorded
transit privileges may be transfered when tonnage
represented thereby is sold, or sold and transferred
from one transit house to another at the transit station, or transferred at the transit station from one
transit house to another transit house of the same
ownership. In connection with tonnage which has
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been sold or transferred, one of the following forms
of assignment must be endorsed on each freight bill:
(a)

The tonnage represented by this freight
bill has been sold to
__________________and the transit privileges thereof, if any, transferred to _________________

~igned

(b)

______________________________________________________

The tonnage represented by this freight
bill has been transferred to _ _ _ __
______________________________and the transit privileges thereof, if any, transferred to _ _
Signed_____

Any additional switching charges performed at
transit station must be charged for in accordance
with tariffs, lawfully on file with the Interstate
Commerce Commission.

Item No. 125
(Effective May 15, 1952)
MIXED SHIPMENTS OF PART TRANSIT AND
PART NON-TRANSIT ARTICLE~
When outbound shipments consist of a mixture
of transit material and non-transit material in the
same car, charges will be assessed as follows:
(a)

On the transit material, at rates indicated
in Item 55.
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vii
(b)

On the non-transit material, at the carload rate on the non-transit material, reshipped from fabrication point to final
destination (see Note).

The entire carload will be subject to the~ highest carload minimum weight of any kind of fabricated material contained in the car (actual weight,
if in excess thereof). Any deficiency in minimum
weight will be added to the non-transit portion, unless shipper surrenders freight bill to cover the deficit in the carload minimum weight, in which event
the deficit will be treated as transit tonnage and
charges assessed accordingly. The weight of the
non-transit portion may be used in making up carload minimum weight.
The term transit material referred to in this
Item is understood to include unfabricated articles
enumerated in Item 5.
The term non-transit material referred to in
this I tern is understood to cover all other Iron or
Steel articles other than those enumerated in Item
5, also accessories and appurtenances necessary to
complete the finished article.
NOTE-On a shipment to a destination located
in the same state as the transit station, the flat carload rate or rates from the transit station on the nontransit portion andjor commodities not entitled to
transit, will be the interstate flat rate or rates from
the transit station to destination, when any or all of
the inbound billing surrendered represents tonnage
originating at points outside of the state in which
the transit station is located.
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